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FOR RELEASE 
~peech of f enator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana) 
FR I JUN 1 2 1959 PM 
THE DEADLOCK AT GENEVA X 
After four weeks of negotiating in Geneva we have little to show 
for our efforts. If the usual procedure is followed, we can expect agitation 
to the effect that we are wasting our time and that our representatives ought 
to come home. For them to do so at this time, in my opinion, would be a 
mistake. It has taken four weeks to bring to a head the basic business of the 
conference. That basic business is Berlin, even though the question of 
Berlin is related to other questions affecting Germany as a whole and Central 
Europe. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that it was the Berlin 
Crisis which brought the Geneva Conference into being in the first place and 
not the larger questions of German reunification or European security. 
In the light of disturbing reports of impending failure at Geneva, 
I should like to recall that just four months ago I addressed the Senate on 
the German situation. In subsequent discussions on the floor other Members 
analyzed this situation in detail and discussed possibilities for meeting the 
problems which it posed. I recall, particularly, the observations of the 
distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations (Mr. Fulbright), 
the remarks of the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Dodd), the bold plan of the 
Senator from Indiana (Mr. Capehart) and the critical and constructive comments 
of the Senator from New York (Mr. Javits). 
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When I spoke on the German situation last February, I was moved 
to do so by one principal consideration. We were committed at that time, as 
we are now, to stand fast in West Berlin. It seemed to me, however, that 
we were committed to that position in support of policies which, conceived 
more than a decade earlier under another Administration, had become 
inadequate, if not obsolete, in the light of current conditions and the current 
needs of this nation and other Western states. It seemed to me that those 
policies no longer held realistic hope of leading towards a stable peace and 
the greater security of freedom in Germany and Europe. They promised --
these inadequate and obsolete policies -- at best only a desperate and costly 
rearguard action to maintain a surface status quo which was becoming ever 
more separated from the underlying realities of the evolving situation in 
Germany, Europe and the world. At worst, those policies promised a 
disastrous diplomatic retreat or a catastrophic war -- limited or unlimited 
-- a war by accident or miscalculation. 
These thoughts, Mr. President, were spoken freely in the Senate 
last February 12. and in four subsequent speeches. They were spoken with 
the intent of being constructive. They were spoken out of a desire to cooperate 
responsibly with the Administration. They were spoken in the hope of 
encouraging a wide utilization of the most powerful device of freedom -- the 
device of full and free discussion -- in order to recast and to strengthen our 
policies to meet the impending crisis in Germany, 
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In that spirit, Mr. President, I advanced nine essentials for a 
positive Western policy on Germany, These proposals were not, for the 
most part, original except in their restatement in the context of my remarks. 
Nor were they set forth in a package, on an ali-or-nothing basis. On the 
contrary, some of them were already implicit in our policies, and all of 
them were obviously subject to modification and elaboration. Nevertheless, 
they were set forth, as one Senator's views, of a possible way around the 
dangerous impasse towards which the world appeared to be headed in Germany. 
Let me recall in summary form at this point these nine suggested 
essentials of policy, as they were stated and developed in subsequent speeches, 
( 1) f:tand fast in Berlin, not as a slogan, not as an end in itself 
but as the basis for a Western initiative for peace in Europe. 
(2) Call upon the German leaders of the East and West Berlin 
communities to begin serious negotiations for unifying the public services and 
municipal government of that city. 
(3} Enlist the conciliatory services of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations in the effort to bring about the interim unification and neutraliza-
but of all Berlin; 
ti.on, not just of West Berlin/ guarantee by U.N. or other international 
means the free use of the routes of access to the entire city until such time 
as it became once again the capital of a unified Germany. 
( 4) If this or a similar approach to interim unification and 
neutralization of all Berlin is not obtained, then continue the Western 
presence in West Berlin, whether or not the Russians chose to leave the 
other sector of the city. 
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(5) If forced to maintain the Western presence in West Berlin in 
such circumstances, however, consider seriously withdrawing the garrisons 
of French, British and American forces from the city and replacing them 
with West Germans supported by NATO guarantees. 
(6) Call upon the Germans in authority in West and East Germany 
to talk, to talk a great deal on the whole range of problems involved in 
harmonizing the political, economic and military systems of the two zones 
as an essential preliminary step to the unification of Germany. 
(7) Call upon the East German communists and the Russians to 
permit the exercise, without the threat of terror, of basic political freedoms 
in the Eastern zone, as a preliminary to reunification. 
(8) 8eek agreements between the ~oviet Union and the Western 
allies to guarantee for a period of years the kind of unified Germany which 
might emerge from German discussions and see to it that a reunited Germany 
is neither subjected to military pressures by its neighbors or becomes a 
source of aggressive military pressure on them. 
(9) To that end consider agreements for the control and limitation 
of armaments in Germany and Central Europe along the lines of the Eden 
Plan, the Rapacki Plan and similar plans, predicating them on satisfactory 
agreements being reached at the Geneva Conferences on the Prevention of 
8urprise Attacks and the Suspension of Nuclear Testing. 
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Mr. President, when these proposals were advanced initially there was 
a great deal of comment on them both at home and abroad. Some of it was 
critical and some of the criticism was little short of an expression of shoc~~ed 
disbelief. 
Yet the proposals were not too far removed from the chane;es which 
Mr. Dulles was seeldng to bring about in VJ estern policy during his last trip 
abroa d, shortly before he was strici:en. Since that time, Mr. President, we 
have, in fact, witnessed a major evolution of United States and Vlestern policy 
with r~spect to Germany in the direction of these proposals. 
This nation went into the present Geneva Conference with a Eeneral 
approach which represented a sharp modification of the policies to which we 
had clun.:; for years. The new approach has made it evident that while we would 
stand fast in Berlin, we would do so not as an end in itself, but as the basis for 
moving towards a reasonable settlement of basic Berlin, German and European 
problems. Beyond standing fast, we have sugeested at Geneva a specific plan 
for bringing about negotiations for the reunification of the public services and 
municipal government of that city. We have called for a phased reunification 
of all Germany based upon extensive contact and extensive talk on the part of 
the German authorities of the East and Vi est prior to free, all-German elections. 
Vle have soueht the restoration of the right of open political activity for all 
Germans, free of terror and legal reprisals, in both zones. V!e have expressed 
our willingness to see:< a e reements between the Soviet Union and the Vl!estern 
n a tions to ~;,uarantee a unified Germany and its neiehbors a eainst a c e;re ssion. 
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We have noted our willingness to consider limiting the level of arrr~aments in 
both parts of Germany and a reduction in foreign forces in that country- -a 
position v•hich seems to me to encompass the basic philosophy of the Eden 
and Rapacld Plans. 
There is really only one sharp difference, Mr. President, between 
the proposals which I suggested last February and the proposals which are 
listed in what has been termed the VJ"estern Package at Geneva. We did not 
see fit to deal initially with Berlin as the most pressing of the German prob-
lems and I am sure Mr. Herter and his associates have had r;ood reasons 
for p roceeding as they h a va until now. Nor have we--Mr. Hammarskjold 
apparently concurring- -seen fit to call upon the conciliatory services of the 
United Nation.s Secretary General to bring about an interim neutralization of 
all Berlin under international auspices. 
One other of the nine essentia ls of policy listed last ~ebruary is not 
embraced in pre sent policy; that is, the possible substitution of V'! est Germans 
for the British, French and l 1merican garrison in V/ est Berlin. That pro-
posal, however, was obviously not associated with a peace settlement. On 
the contrary, it was intended as an alternative if the efforts to ne :::;otiate a 
settlement in good faith were to fail. 
Mr. President, I have taken the time of the Senate to review in 
juxtaposition discussions and events that occurred in the past, and have 
since tal~en place at Geneva. I have not undertaken this comparison out of 
any desire to vindicate a position. I have not had occasion to alter that 
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position significantly in the past and I see no need to justify it now. It was 
presented, in February, as one Senator's views. It is still one Senator's 
views. 
No, Mr. President, that has not been my purpose. My purpose 
today as it was last February is to contribute constructively to the policies 
which this Administration conducts on behalf of all of us, on behalf of all the 
people of this nation--the policies upon which the peace and the well-being of 
the United States so greatly depend. 
Specifically, Mr. President, I wish, today, to call attention to the 
fact that when I initially advanced the nine proposals they were not criticized 
by a man who by the nature of his position has an enormous influence upon 
the prospects for peace in the world. The Senate may recall that Premier 
Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union commented publicly on the remarks 
which I made on February 12. I refer, Mr. President, to a news story which 
appeared in the Washington Star, February 19, 1959. 
Mr. Khrushchev is reported in this story as hailing as 11worthy of 
attention" certain of these proposals. He went on to say that "One could 
reach agreement with people who have adopted such sober attitudes. 11 He 
went on to say, further, "Supporters of the cold war are attacking Mansfield 
and accusing him of making concessions to the U.s.s.R. Nobody is making 
any concessions to us. Mansfield is just thinking soberly and sensibly." 
It was the recollection of that comment by Mr. Khrushchev which 
led me to make this statement, today, at a moment when the Geneva 
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Confer~nce may be in dancer of failure. 'ilhat I wish to point out is this: I£ 
the Soviet Premier believed a few months ar:;o that the proposals which I had 
made were "sober and sensible, 11 and, if, as I have just noted, proposals of 
a very sin:ilar nature have been introduced at Geneva by the \"!estern delega-
tiona, then, perhaps, Mr. Khrushchev should also rezard the latter as "sober 
and sensible. 11 
True, l\lir. President, in comparing the statement which I made on 
February 12 with the \!estern proposals which were presented in Geneva, one 
rr.ay find that the "i' s 11 are not always dotted in precisely the same way and the 
"t' s" are not always crossed exactly alE~e. But the intent is very similar. 
Therefore, if the Goviet Premier believed that a basis for bonafide negotiations 
resided in r.<1y staterr.ent, he rr.ay rest assured that it is also ~:: resent in the 
·~;! estern proposals. Unless he has changed his rr.ind since that time or unless 
he has not ceen adequately inforrr.ed, I believe Mr. Khrushchev will find that 
these "v"!estern proposals at the Conference are equally, if not rtJore so, "v-torthy 
of attention." I believe he will discover that the Secretary of Gtate 1 Mr. Herter 1 
has presented these 1:,roposals not out of any attemp t to secure a hollow propa-
zanda victory, not out of any desire to exacerbate the cold war, ~:::ut in a sincere 
effort to express in a practical fashion, the desire of the peor:le of the United 
States to find a secure and equitable settlement of the fundamental p roblems of 
a divided Berlin, a divided Germany and a divided .Surope. J,t the least, I 
:respectfully suc;;est to Mr. :C~hrushchev that these proposals are worthy of a 
more careful treatment at the hands of the Soviet Premier than they received 
at the hands of the Soviet dele ::;ation which tended to dismiss them as completely 
unacceptable or too involved or too complex. 
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M r. President, I call the attention of the [ oviet Fremier to these 
matters in the hope that, as he recogniz~s that the larger interests of the 
Russian people, the people of the United .States and all peoples require peace, 
no less will he recognize that the wish for p~ace must be translated into the 
acts of peace. Specifically, it must be translated into agreements. What is 
done in this connection at Geneva is essential to what may come later at a 
summit. 
If the West were to go to the summit, or, indeed, if the foviet Union 
were to go to the summit with the two positions as far apart as they now are, 
as a realist, Iv"r. Krushchev must know that little if anything would be accom-
plished. That is why I hope the Soviet premier himself will consider the 
Western proposals. I hope he will study them. I hope, on the basis of his 
personal study, he will be specific, he will instruct his aides at Geneva in 
terms of "this we can accept and this we must talk about further". It seems 
to me, in the light of President Eisenhower's desire and effort to be reason-
able, in the light of the new approach which the Western nations have pursued 
at Geneva, some such action on Mr. Krushchev's part is essential at this 
point to advance the cause of peace. He can do much to clarify the areas of 
agreement which already exist and to delineate the areas of disagreement 
which must be reconciled by direct talks of Heads of States. Unless this is 
done now, what, indeed, can we or the Russians expect to achieve by a meet-
ing of a few days duration at the summit? If there is, in fact, something else 
to be achieved then it would be helpful if the Soviet Premier made clear what 
it is. 
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I urge this course, in all sincerity, on the Soviet Premier. I urge 
him to take it before positions solidify into the brittle crusts of propaganda, 
before decisions are made that cannot be revoked. In this connection Let me 
say that it may not be possible to stop the E:oviet Union from making a separate 
peace treaty with East Germany, if that is its intention. Nor can that nation 
be stopped from withdrawing its forces from Berlin, if it so desires, before a 
broad settlement is reached. If either of these irrevocable steps is taken, 
however, the tasks of peace-making will be infinitely compounded. The 
breach may no Longer be closable in this generation or the next. The seeds 
of inevitable war may well be implanted. 
The moment calls for patience, not impetuosity. It calls for forebear-
ance. This is not the time for the West or for the Soviet Union to entertain 
the idea of picking up their respective marbles and going home. 
We have stated and we will continue to reiterate, as the President and 
Secretary Herter have on so many occasions, that there will be no summit 
meeting unless a degree ci progre ss is achieved. The President noted on 
June 3 that he would be prepared to define liberally what he meant by progress. 
I commend him for his willingnes a to stay in the game and for his statesman-
ship in giving every possible encouragement to our Secretary of !:tate in the 
difficult negotiations now being conducted in Geneva. 
If we are firmly convinced that there is no basis for a settlement, then 
we should be prepared to break off the conference, cleanly, honestly, and 
without futile recriminations. We should not do so, however, until every 
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possible facet is explored and every possible move is made. I am certain 
that it is fue intent of the President and Secretary Herter and his colleagues 
to strive to arrive at equitable agreements. I am Likewise certain that if 
and when the time arrives when the representatives of the West are convinced 
that there is no point in continuing the talks at Geneva, that they wiLL make 
their decision known and return to their respective countries. Certainly, 
however, that point has not yet been reached. Let us be in no hurry. Let 
us be patient and Let us explore every reasonable and honorable channel in 
the hope that an agreement is still possible and that the deepest desire of 
mankind can, at least in part, be realized. No nation at this critical time 
has the right to be more interested in saving face than in safeguarding 
civilization. 
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